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Trustee Liability for Breach of Trust—Loss or 
Profit, or Loss and Profit? 
Kenneth F. Joyce* 
Uniform Trust Code section 1002(a) provides as follows: 
(a) A trustee who commits a breach of trust is liable to 
the beneficiaries affected for the greater of: 
(1) the amount required to restore the value of the 
trust property and trust distributions to what they would have 
been had the breach not occurred; or 
(2) the profit the trustee made by reason of the 
breach. 
As stated by Professor David M. English (the UTC Reporter), 
The measure of damages for breach of trust is designed to re-
store the trust property and distributions to what they would 
have been had the breach not occurred. But it also serves an-
other purpose—to prevent the trustee from profiting from the 
breach. Consequently, under the Code, the trustee is liable for 
the higher of the two amounts: the profit made by the trustee 
or the loss to the trust.1 
This “greater of” formula is non-problematic when there is either 
(1) a loss to the trust but no profit to the trustee or (2) no loss to the 
trust but profit to the trustee. In many cases, however, there is both a 
loss to the trust and profit to the trustee. 
In such cases, the “make whole”/restorative objective of section 
1002(a)(1) is fully accomplished, since the trustee will always be liable 
for an amount at least equal to the amount of the loss. The question has 
been raised, however, whether the same can be said for the restitution/ 
disgorgement objective of section 1002(a)(2). It is true that, as in the 
case of loss to the trust, the trustee will always be liable for an amount at 
least equal to the amount of the profit. But, it has been argued, since the 
* Professor, Emeritus (SUNY/Buffalo Law School). Special thanks for their 
thoughtful assistance to Professors Andrew Kull (University of Texas Law School) and 
Douglas Laycock (University of Virginia Law School) (Respectively Reporter and Ad-
viser for the Restatement, Third, of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment), and Ira Bloom 
(Albany Law School) (a major architect of the proposed New York Trust Code). 
1 David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and 
Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 203 (2002). 
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trustee would have been liable for the full amount of the section 
1002(a)(1) loss if there had been no section 1002(a)(2) profit, the resti-
tution/disgorgement objective can only be fully accomplished by making 
the trustee liable for both the loss and the profit. 
This issue was raised in a recent decision by the Supreme Court of 
New Mexico, Miller v. Bank of America,2 where the trustee, in violation 
of the express trust terms, maintained an investment in unproductive 
realty which lost substantial value. In addition, the trustee, in an attempt 
to refurbish the realty, made loans to the trust and earned a profit in 
interest and loan fees. 
Miller is especially notable because New Mexico enacted the UTC 
in 2003 and, in 2007, added, verbatim, section 1002(a). The Miller court, 
however, held that section 1002(a) did not govern because it interpreted 
section 1002(a)(2) as applying only to “profit accruing to the trust” and 
not to profit made by the trustee personally: “The alternatives in Section 
46A–10–1002 do not apply to a trustee’s wrongful personal profit.”3 
Thus holding section 1002(a) inapplicable, the Miller Court deter-
mined that the New Mexico Uniform Trust Code codified the common 
law4 and that under the common law the trustee was liable for both the 
loss to the trust and the trustee’s personal profit, except to the extent 
that it could be shown, on remand, that the trustee’s profit had been 
included in calculating the loss to the trust. 
As stated by the Miller Court: 
Loss to Beneficiaries and profit by the Bank are distinct 
harms that traditionally give rise to different types of damages: 
restoration and disgorgement. Each has its own remedial pur-
pose, and both may be awarded if necessary to satisfy each 
purpose fully by compensating the trust and removing all profit 
from the Bank’s self-dealing.5 
Ironically, Miller’s interpretation of section 1002(a)(2), which led to 
this holding, stemmed from the following UTC Official Comment to 
section 1002(a): 
Subsection (a) is based on Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Pru-
dent Investor Rule 205 (1992). 
2 352 P.3d 1162, 1164 (N.M. 2015). 
3 Id. at 1168. 
4 Id. at 1167. See also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 106 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“The 
common law of trusts and principles of equity supplement this [Code], except to the 
extent modified by this [Code] or another statute of this State.”). 
5 Miller, 352 P.3d at 1168-69. 
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That section 205 provided as follows: 
A trustee who commits a breach of trust is 
(a) accountable for any profit accruing to the trust 
through the breach of trust; or 
(b) chargeable with the amount required to restore the 
values of the trust estate and trust distributions to what 
they would have been if the trust had been properly 
administered. 
In addition, the trustee is subject to such liability as necessary 
to prevent the trustee from benefiting personally from the 
breach of trust (see § 206).6 
The Comment to section 205 further explained: 
a. Alternatives available to the beneficiaries. If a trustee 
commits a breach of trust, the beneficiaries may affirm the 
transaction and accept the results of the trustee’s improper 
conduct. In such a case the trustee is accountable for any prof-
its accruing to the trust as a result of the breach. 
Comparing this 1992 Restatement language with section 1002(a) 
reveals that the UTC drafters, first, eliminated the reference to “profit 
accruing to the trust” (which, as noted in the Restatement Comment, 
referred to the beneficiaries’ choice of ratifying the breach instead of 
surcharging the trustee for the loss), and then translated the Restate-
ment’s provision regarding the “trustee . . . benefiting personally” into 
the “greater of ” formula of UTC section 1002(a). Therefore, if Miller 
had viewed section 1002(a) in its proper historical context it would have 
held that the section 1002(a)(2) reference was to the trustee’s personal 
profit and not to the “profit accruing to the trust.”7 
In this regard, however, it should be noted that in Miller ten law 
professors (including the author) filed an Amicus Brief, drafted by Pro-
fessor Melanie Leslie (presently Dean of Cardozo Law School) in which 
6 This section was superseded in 2012 by RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 100 
(AM. LAW INST. 2012), i.e., after the UTC was adopted in 2000. See infra note 7. 
7 Further evidence of the Court’s misinterpretation of section 1002(a)(2) can be 
seen in the Comment to UTC section 1003 (which requires disgorgement of trustee profit 
even absent a breach) stating that the UTC section 1003 phrase “profit made by the 
trustee”, which mirrors the language of section 1002(a)(2), refers to the rule that “a trus-
tee should not be allowed to use the trust as a means for personal profit.” See also RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 100, promulgated 12 years after the UTC was adopted 
(“A trustee who commits a breach of trust is chargeable with (a) the amount required to 
restore the values of the trust estate and trust distributions to what they would have been 
if the portion of the trust affected by the breach had been properly administered; or (b) 
the amount of any benefit to the trustee personally as a result of the breach.” (emphasis 
added)). 
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they argued that the Court should, as it did, hold that the trustee should 
be liable for both the loss and the profit.8 The Amici so argued, how-
ever, not because they agreed with the Miller view that section 
1002(a)(2) did not apply to the trustee’s personal profit, but rather be-
cause they viewed Miller as really involving two separate breaches, each 
to be tested by a separate application of section 1002(a)(1) and section 
1002(a)(2) [which the Amici agreed referred to the trustee’s personal 
profit]. 
Close analysis of the Amicus Brief, however, indicates that the 
Amici’s basic position would apply even if only one breach was in-
volved. That position, alluded to at the outset of this article, proceeds as 
follows: 
Since the trustee would have been liable for the full 
amount of the 1002(a)(1) loss if there had been no profit to the 
trustee, under the “greater of” formula the trustee’s “bottom 
line/out of pocket” liability for the 1002(a)(1) loss is dimin-
ished (and possibly entirely eliminated) by the amount of the 
1002(a)(2) profit and, therefore, full accomplishment of both 
the restorative/“make whole” and the restitution/disgorgement 
objectives requires that the trustee be held liable for both the 
loss and the profit.9 
To view this argument as a balance sheet, assume a trustee bank 
with personal assets of 500 sells Greenacre (trust property) worth 100 to 
a bank customer for 80, and as part of the plan, the customer takes out a 
loan from the trustee bank and pays 10 in interest. There is thus a loss to 
the trust of 20 and a profit to the trustee of 10 and the profit is not 
included in the loss. 
Because the profit is not part of the loss, the following obtains: 
Assets Liabilities Net Worth 
Before the breach 500 0 500 
If the breach had caused only loss (20) 500 20 480 
But 
(a) The breach caused loss (20) and profit 
(10)- so, under “greater of” 510 20 490 
(b) The breach caused loss (20) and profit 
(10)- so, under Miller 510 30 480 
8 Brief of Trust Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Petitioners 
at 7-8, Miller v. Bank of Am., 352 P.3d 1162 (2015) (No. 34,554). 
9 Id. 
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What this example shows, argued the Amici, is that, if the trustee is 
liable for only the greater of the loss and the profit, the trustee is “rela-
tively better off” with the profit than without. And thus “the [trustee] 
has been allowed to profit from its own wrong.”10 If, on the other hand, 
the trustee is liable for both the loss and the profit, it ends up in the 
same position as when there is a loss but no profit. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that the trustee bank and its customer 
buy Greenacre jointly for 80 (each contributing 40). Again, there is 20 of 
loss to the trust and 10 of profit to the trustee, but because here the loss 
includes the profit, the following obtains: 
Assets Liabilities Net Worth 
Before the breach 500 0 500 
The breach causes loss (20) and profit (10)-
so, under “greater of” 510 20 490 
The breach causes loss (20) and profit (10)-
so, under Miller 510 20 490 
Because the amount of the loss will always be equal to, or greater 
than, the profit when the loss includes the profit, the restorative and 
restitution objectives will be fully accomplished by making the trustee 
liable only for the loss. As Miller held, there is no reason to make the 
trustee pay back the profit twice. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the above discussion suggests that consideration 
should be given to whether UTC section 1002(a) should be amended as 
follows: 
(1) Inserting the word “personal”, to make it clear that [as in 
section 205 of Restatement, Third, Prudent Investor Rule 
(1992) and section 100 of Restatement, Third, of Trusts 
(2012)] the profit “made by the trustee” refers to personal 
profit and not to “profit accruing to the trust”, and 
(2) to reflect the Miller approach in order to accomplish fully 
the section 1002(a) goal, stated above by the UTC Re-
porter Professor David M. English, “to prevent the trustee 
from profiting from the breach.” 
10 Id. at 23-24. 
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The following illustrates these possible amendments: 
1002(a) 
A trustee who commits a breach of trust is liable to the 
beneficiaries affected for the greater of: 
(1) the amount required to restore the value of the 
trust property and trust distributions to what they would have 
been had the breach not occurred; or and 
(2) the personal profit the trustee made by reason of 
the breach to the extent that such amount is not included in the 
amount determined under subsection (a)(1).11 
11 The proposed New York Trust Code, available at https://digitalcommons.law.buf 
falo.edu/other_scholarship/46, currently reflects such a Miller approach, providing: 
[A] trustee who commits a breach of trust by breaching the duty of loyalty is 
chargeable with 
(1) the greater of: 
(A) the value of the capital lost by reason of the breach plus prejudgment 
interest as determined by the court; or 
(B) the amount required to restore the values of the trust property to what 
they would have been if the portion of the trust affected by the breach had been 
properly administered; and 
(2) the amount of any benefit to the trustee personally as a result of the 
breach to the extent that such amount is not included in the amount determined 
under subparagraph (1)(A) or (1)(B). 
(proposed N.Y. TRUST CODE § 7-A-10.2(c) (emphasis added)). 
In addition, it should be noted that section 409 of ERISA (Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974), 29 U.S.C. 1109, and its legislative history also reflect the 
Miller position that in certain cases the fiduciary should be liable for both the loss and 
any personal profit caused by the breach. Section 1109(a) provides: 
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the 
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this sub-
chapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the 
plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of 
such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the 
fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the 
court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary. 
29 U.S.C. 1109(a) (2012) (emphasis added). See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 93-1280 (1974), as 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5100 (“[A] fiduciary who breaches the fiduciary 
requirements of the bill is to be personally liable for any losses to the plan resulting from 
this breach. Such a fiduciary is also to be liable for restoring to the plan any profits which 
he has made through the use of any plan asset.” (emphasis added)). See also Bricklayers & 
Allied Craftworkers Local v. Penn Valley Tile, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 3d 487 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
Cf. Moitoso v. FMR LLC, No. 18-12122-WGY, 2019 WL 4980390 (D. Mass. Oct. 8, 2019). 
